The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is one of the success stories of arms control. That may sound surprising. As the treaty's 187 members start their five-yearly meeting in New York this week, the talk is mostly of where it has failed. True, since the NPT came into force in 1970, Israel, India and Pakistan - none of them signatories - have acquired nuclear weapons. In 2003 North Korea simply walked out, and it is now believed to have half a dozen warheads. Yet apart from these setbacks, the treaty has kept the world relatively nuclear-free.
Today, however, the NPT is looking shaky. It is founded on the bargain that in return for the non-nuclear states staying nuke-free, the five recognised nuclear weapons states will help them develop nuclear power and at the same time take steps to disarm themselves. That last promise now looks decidedly hollow. The US wants to develop a new generation of mini-nukes, and even the UK is talking about renewing its relatively small nuclear arsenal. How much longer will the non-weapons states keep their side of the bargain?
Some have suggested that preventing proliferation is too important to be a hostage to disarmament, so these aspects of the treaty should be decoupled. This is wishful thinking. Non-nuclear states are not likely to stay that way, nor submit to more proliferation controls, unless there is something in it for them. If the nuclear states want to stop proliferation, they will have to keep their side of the bargain and get serious about disarmament.
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